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NOTES AND COMMENTS

the courts hold that payments under the pension statute are in the
1
nature of a bonus or compensation.'
The principal case is in accord with the general weight of authority throughout the United States. The answer to the problem presented,
however, depends largely on the peculiar wording of the particular
statutes involved.' 8 In Indiana, firemen have been held to be municipal employees for other purposes.' 9 No sufficient reason is apparent
20
why any distinction should be made for the purposes of this act.
Moreover, in view of the general terminology used in the act to define "employer" and "employee", and of the avowed purpose of the
courts to extend the coverage of the act in so far as possible,21 it is
believed that a better result would have been to hold that firemen are
"employees" under the Workmens Compensation Act.

ATTACHMENT OF INCOME OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
Schwager v. Schwager
Defendant is beneficiary of a spend-thrift trust set up by his
mother's will subsequent to divorce of son by his first wife. The will
provided that if the trustees apprehend that the interest of the beneficiary is threatened to be diverted they shall divert the income and
principal from distribution to the defendant and use the same as they
deem expedient to support and maintenance of the beneficiary and
members of his family then dependent on him for support, not however,
including his first wife or any of his children by her. The plaintiffs,
divorced wife and children (two of whom are minors), sue to attach
the income or corpus of the trust for alimony and support. Held,
No recovery allowed; under Wisconsin law a testator may dispose of
his property as his judgment may dictate, the courts cannot change
or modify a will or substitute in its place one which they deem more
equitable or just.1
Trusts in which the interest of the beneficiary cannot be assigned
by him or reached by his creditors have come to be known as "spendthrift trusts". It is immaterial whether or not the beneficiary is in
fact a spendthrift. The purpose of the settlor in creating the trust
is to protect the beneficiary against his own folly, inefficiency or misfortune.2 Cases upholding the restraint of alienation of trust income
IND. STAT. ANN. (1933), H 48-6506, 6507.
IsMcDonald v. New Haven, 94 Conn. 403, 109 Atl. 176, 10 A. L. R.
193, 201 (1920). See Note (1932), 81 A. L. R. 478; Stene, Application
of State Workmen's Compensation Laws to Public Employees and Officers (1932), 17 Minn. L. Rev. 162.
19 City of Peru v. State ex rel. McGuire, 210 Ind. 668, 119 N. E.
151 (1936).
20 SEE Fabler v. City of Minot, 49 N. Dak. 960, 194 N. W. 695
(1923).
23 McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839 (1922);
In re Duncan, 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289 (1919).
'Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F. (2d) 754 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
2 SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) 742.
27 BURNS
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to be good against creditors most often use the rationale that a settlor
may dispose of his property as he wishes as long as third persons are
not thereby injured. Creditors are not injured by the disposition
because it is a windfall to the beneficiary: nothing is taken from
creditors on which they relied for payment. 3 Some states have by
statute permitted creditors of a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to
attach the income accrued in the hands of the trustee. 4 In absence
of statute, however, the majority rule is that the entire income is still
exempt.5 Indiana has no such statute and there are no cases on the
point.
Only ten states have ruled as to whether a divorced wife of a
beneficiary may reach the income or corpus of the trust for maintenance and support or in satisfaction of a judgment for alimony.
Six stales deny the divorced wife the right to recoverG Of the remaining four states, California, Illinois and New York, allow recovery
only from the surplus income of the trust above that necessary for
support and education of the beneficiary.7 The tenth state, Iowa, has
allowed the divorced wife to recover because the husband beneficiary
3 Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 43 Amer.
Rep. 504 (1882) ; see Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 23 L. Ed. 254 (1875) ;
Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. 318, 143 N.E. 838 (1924);
Costigan, Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift
Trusts" Reexamined (1934) 32 Calif. L.Rev. 471.
4 For a complete discussion of these statutes see SCOTT, LAW OF
TRUSTS (1939) 750 ff.
5 Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882); Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. 318, 143 N.E. 838 (1924); Cromwell
v. Converse, 108 Conn. 412, 143 Atl. 413 (1928) ; Bridgeport City Trust
Co. v. Beach, 119 Conn. 131, 174 Atl. 305 (1934); Darling v. Dodge,
200 Iowa 1303, 206 N.W. 266 (1925); Jourolman v. Massengill, 86
Tenn. 81, 5 S.W. 719 (1887).
6 Todd v. Todd, 260 Ky. 611, 86 S.W.(2d) 168 (1935) (Beneficiary
has no interest in income which can be attached previous to actual
payment to him); Bucknam v. Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N.E.
918 (1936) (Alimony is of the nature of debt, the wife stands in no
better position than a creditor, also the settlor did not intend that
the wife participate in the trust fund) ; Burrage v. Bucknam, 16 N.E.
(2d) 705 (Mass. 1938); Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W.
715 (1910) (Payment of alimony is not within uses to which trustee
was authorized to apply trust property); Note (1936) 34 Mich. L.R.
1269; Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N.W. 161 (1936) (Wife
no better than a creditor; settlor did not intend that wife participate) ;
Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926) (Wife no better than
a creditor; beneficiary's needs include his family's but his family does
not include his wife after divorce) ; Thackara v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151
(1882) (Wife no better than a creditor), cf Moorehead's Estate, 137
Atl. 802, 289 Pa. 542 (1927); Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 578,
172 Atl. 36 (1934). Note (1928) 41 Har. L.Rev. 409.
7 Canfield v. Security First National Bank of Los Angeles, 8 Cal.
App.(2d) 277, 48 P.(2d) 133 (1933) (Surplus income subject to
claims of beneficiary's creditors under Calif. Civ. Code, § 859, 867)
approved in Canfield v. Security First National Bank of Los Angeles,
13 Cal.(2d) 1, 87 P(2d) 830 (1938); England v. England, 223 Ill.
Ann. 549 (1922); Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 Ill. App. 552 (1929);
Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520, 33 L.R.A. 708 (1896); Fink v.
Fink, 248 N.Y.S. 129, 139 Misc. 630 (1931).
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had paid a consideration for the trust. The court in this Iowa case
specifically states that if there is nothing present to avoid a spend8
Thus on numerical
thrift trust the divorced wife cannot recover.
weight of authority seven states deny the divorced wife any recovery
and three give her only a limited recovery. Consequently as pointed
9
out in the majority opinion of the principal case, the position of
0
the Restatement of the Law Trusts that a wife may reach the income from a spendthrift trust for satisfaction of a claim for alimony
is not supported by the cases at the present time.
At least two states have enacted specific statutes allowing the
divorced wife to reach the trust income. 1 Under provisions of creditor statutes, which a number of states have enacted,12 the California
and New York courts treat the divorced wife as a creditor and allow
her to reach the trust.' 3
A wife living apart from the husband, but not divorced, has been
successful in subjecting the trust income of the husband beneficiary
4
to attachment for support and maintenance.1 This is done on the
theory that a husband has a moral and legal obligation to support his
family and the wife is a member of the family until divorce. Children
8 De Rousse v. Williams, 164 N.W. 896, 897, 181 Iowa 379 (1917) ;
(Wife
is no better than a creditor; testator may dispose of his property as
he desires).
9 109 F. (2d) 754, 760.
10 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 157.
"- Louisiana Act 81, Laws of 1938, § 28. Income may be reached
for support of wife or child in certain amounts and in addition, according to what shall be just under the circumstances. MISSOURI REVISED STATUTES (1929) § 569. All spendthrift trust provisions shall
be void "against the claims of any wife child or children of cestui
que trust for support and maintenance, or, as against the claim of
any said wife for alimony."
12MONTANA REVISED CODE (1921) § 6788; NORTH DAKOTA COMPILED
LAWS (1913) § 5369; OKLAHOMA STATUTES (1931) § 11825; SOUTH DAKOTA COMPILED LAWS (1929) § 376.
1sWetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520, 33 L.R.A. 708 (1896);
Fink v. Fink, 248 N.Y.S. 129, 139 Misc. Rep. 630 (1931); the wife
even takes precedence over judgment creditors, Demuth v. Kemp, 144
N.Y.S. 690, 159 App. Div. 422 (1913), affirmed, 216 N.Y. 757, 111
N.E. 1086 (1916). Canfield v. Security First National Bank of Los
Angeles, 8 Cal. App.(2d) 277, 48 P.(2d) 133 (1935).
14 Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 Atl. 802 (1927); Thomas
v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 578, 172 At. 36 (1934); Pruyn v. Sears,
161 N.Y.S. 58, 96 Misc. 200 (1916); Wife allowed support up to time
of divorce but not afterwards, Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 Atl.
10 (1926); Wife and children allowed to reach income for support
upon beneficiary becoming insane, Gardner v. O'Laughlin, 76 N.H. 481,
84 Atl. 935 (1912).
Is Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926); Thomas v.
Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 578, 172 Atl. 36 (1934) ; Gardner v. O'Laughlin,
76 N.H. 481, 84 Atl. 935 (1912); Pruyn v. Sears, 161, N.Y.S. 58, 96
Misc. 200 (1916).

cf. Kiffner v. Kiffner, 185 Iowa 1064, 171 N.W. 590 (1919)
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of the beneficiary have also been successful in reaching the trust
income for support. 15 The decisions are not without conflict however. 16
In the absence of a statute allowing the divorced wife to reach
the trust income, the principal case follows the correct rule in regard
to alimony. If the trust is created previous to the marriage the wife
has notice that she will not be able to attach the income for payment
of alimony should they ever be divorced. Even if the trust is created
following the marriage she is in no worse position than if the trust
had never been created, there could have been no reliance on the
trust income at the time of the marriage. Her solution is to sue for
separate maintenance and support; or, if she desires a divorce, to
get a lump sum settlement instead of alimony before the divorce is
i-iade final.
In Indiana. alimony in the form of periodic payments has been
replaced by statute providing for a decree of a lump sum. 17 For this
lump sum a judgment could be giv-n which would seem to lie a debt
foi whici no levy on the income of the spendthrift trust could be
nade. As for the children, however, an Indiana court may under the
divorce statute make provision for the support and education of the
minor children.18 Moreover, the court has power to compel fathers to
support their minor children without regard to the divorce statute' 9
and a husband has a legal duty to support his wife.20 When the husband or father is the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, an equity
decree ordering him to pay might be made. With an evident source
of income he could not on grounds of inability to pay, avoid being
in contempt for non payment. Thus the status of the Indiana law
would indicate that an undivorced wife or a mnnor child could reach
the trust income for support.
16 Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N.W. 161 (1936),
Todd v. Todd, 260 Ky 611, 86 S.W (2d) 168 (1935); Keller v. Keller,
284 Ill. App. 198, 1 N.E.(2d) 773 (1936), Note (1936) 30 Ill. L.Rev.1067.
17BURN'S IND. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 3-1218. This provision does
not apply where there is only a limited divorce, see § 3-1232. Gold-

berg v. Goldberg, 72 Ind. App. 477, 126 N.E. 36, (1920)
18 BURN'S IND. STAT. ANN. (1933) Sec. 3-1219.
19 Leibold v. Leibold, 158 Ind. 60, 62 N.E. 627 (1902)
20 BURN'S IND. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 10-1405, 38-116.

